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Industrial Relations in :Switzerlan~d 
F. J. L. Young* 
Switzerland .and the Scandinavian countries are noted for their low le1,els of industrial 
conflict. Thereafter the similan·ry between the twv approaches to industrial relations 
becomes rather tenuous. The S~liSS system of industria/ relations is anything but 
centralised. It demonstrates what mt1ny outside observers tnight consider acute sensitivity 
to the preservation of individUlll freedom of choice. To some extent this may be explained 
in te.rms of Switzerland's unique form of direct democracy. At the sam.e time, there is 
el,idence that this rnulti cultural federation with conzplications of language and religion has 
,achieved a large measure of consensus on the procedural aspects of industrial relations. In 
this respect, the peace agreement approach first introduced in 193 7 has been described by 
an e~perienced Swiss mediator as uthe main pillar of Swiss industrial peace·: 1 
The Impact of Dir:ect Democracy 
The role of govemn1ent in the Swiss system of industrial relations is quite muted. At the 
san1e time it is clear that the syste.m of direct democracy can make the actors sensitive to 
the views of citizens. Citizens have the right to launch an initiative (or proposal) for an 
an1endment to the Constitution and the right to vote for rejection of any parliamentary 
bill. The referendunz is commonly used to resolve issues of federal, cantonal or local 
concern. The Swiss Confederation is n1ade up of 26 Cantons or administrative regions. 
How this impacts upon industria] relations can be illustrated by re·Cerence to a proposal 
to .introduce the 40 hour week. In 1976 a politically motivated initiative was launched to 
secure an immediate introduction of such a reduction in the work week. This was rejected 
in the subsequent referendum by a majority of four to one. Majority opinion is said to have 
considered the proposed change too rapid and likely to cause significant difficulties. There-
after, trade unions commenced fostering their own initiative for a refer~endun1 on phased 
introduction of reduced working hours. Employers sought to negotiate the matter at 
enterprise level and govemn1ent expressed the hope that the issue could be resolved by 
collective bargaining {thus permitting withdrawal of the initiative). 
It would seem then that the actors are very much aware of the inherent cautiousness of 
the con1munity. This may well reflect Switzerland's lack of natural resources. Despite its 
very high standard of living, the federation must import virtually all its raw n1aterials, well 
over 60 percent of its food and in ·excess of 80 percent of its energy. The need to export to 
survive is ,ever present with the export of goods and services accounting for about 40 per-
cent of GNP. 2 
• ,F.J.L. Young is Professor of Industrial Relations and Director of the Industrial Relations Centre at 
Victoria University o:f Wellington. This paper represents a substantial rewriting and updating of 
another paper, The Swiss Peace Agreetnenr. originally prepared ~or the Nelson Trades Council's 
Industrial Relations Seminar in 1979. Wai Meng Foo acted as Research Assistant during the prepara-
tion of the paper. 
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The Acton3 
The Trade Unions 
Would the Swiss system of industrial relations have been more confUct prone if the 
trade unions were stronger? In comparison with the very high lewis of 
achieved by their counterparts in Scandinavia, Swiss trade unions cowr uound 35 pWcent 
of the country's labour force of nearly three mntion. How much oae should 
to this comparatively low level of organisation is questionable. American trade wdons 
currently seem hard pressed to maintain an average annual men1benhip of 25 percent tl 
the labour force. The American system of industrial relations experiences much higher 
levels of conflict than either Switzerland or the Scandinavian countries. 
While Swiss trade unions are usually organised industriaDy, there is a variety of uatlonal 
bodies. Five national confederations (see Table I) most trade unions and cater 
for a number of different political and religious beliefs. 
Table I : Major Swiss Trade Union Confederations 
Grouping 
1 . Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund 
(SGB)· 
2. Vereinigung Schweizerisher 
Angestelltenverbande (VSA) 
3. Christlichnationaler 
Gewerkschaftsbund (CNG) 
4. I andverband Frier 
Schweizer Arbeiter (LFSA) 
5. Schweizerisher Verband 
Evangelischer Arbeitnehmer (SVEA) 
A/ftlilltlon 
Social Democrat 
Independent 
Roman Catholic 
Uberal 
Protestant 
Source: European Jndustrilll Relations Review, 12, 1980. 
Membmhlp 
450,000 
150,000 
100,000 
20,000 
18,000 
Two smaller confederations cover bank employees and pubHc servants. Too mudl 
significance, it would seem, should not be attached to this fraamentation of the 
at the national level. Unlike their Saandinavian counterparts, the confededtioDa are not 
directly involved in collective bargaining. They concentrate on the pro¥ilion of data 
required by affiliated unions for collective barpining and on the trainina of 
officials. They also lobby on behalf of their affiliates and memben with the Federal 
Government. 
More significant than the fragmentation of the movenaent natioaally Ia the clo11Mace 
of the pace-setting Metalworken and Watchmaken Union. It coJnprilea one third of the 
social democrat confederation (SGB) membenhip. Furthermore, ita activltiel toaetJaer 
with those of the graphic trades and the raHway worken cowr the moat 
sectors of the labour force. 
With industry-wide coUective bargaining, the uuiou in the workplace Ia 
effective in two ways. The system of union deleptes provides for the of 
individual grievances and the passing of information to and fi'Oin the aalon lllCl 
grass roots membenhip. The system of works councila, uau•lly eatablilhed by cdltctl• 
agreement. gives elected union memben certain rishta of co-deteunlnatiaft. 
3 Europ~n lndwtrllll nltltlonl replew ( 1980) 72 : pp 16 - 18. 
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It should be t~oted that the members of a works council are elected by the whole work 
force including members of management. The actual organisation and functions of each 
council are usually left to the discretion of its rnembers. The type of co-detennination 
·th b u ·1 front uestions of social interest and w·elfare. thro_. __ 
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industrial relations. The Swiss distinguish between an absolute peace and a 
re Ia t i ve one. Under an absolute peace agreeu1ent the parties bind 10IUbtiUtly not 
to strike or lockout under any circumstances during the currency of a coDecthe . 
Where a relative peace agreement is in effect, the parties simply abide by the lepl_obliaa-
tion to abstain from stoppages over matten explicitly cowred by their qreeme&t. 
Surprisingly to an outsider, the absolute peace agreement is more cotnmon than the relatiw 
one. It is reported that about 66 percent of entployees covered by coDectlw 
work under the absolute obligation. (Crossland 1979) 
The peace agreement approach was pioneered in the engineerina ad metalworJdna 
industries in the late 1930s. 5 It was associated with two strong personaHties (the 
of the Metalworkers and Watchmakers Union and the President of the Employen .Anocia-
tion). Strong personalities alone, however, cannot explain the agreement'• existellce ad 
success. Swiss history, attitudes and institutions were undoubtedly contributtaa faeton. 
So too, according to the Hterature, was the rise of Nazi , which lecl the 
community to close ranks. Whatever their relative influence, facton created an 
environment which made possible the negotiation of the 1937 Peace A&reement. With 
minor amendments, this remained in effect until extensively renegotiated in the 19601and 
1970s. 
The introduction to the 1937 agreement spelled out the principlea tbe 
relationship between its signatories. The overall aim was to presene industrial peace. The 
signatories were required to deal with each other in mutual good faith, settle dilputes 
within the. terms of the agreement and accept the absolute peace obliption. 1he applica-
tion of these principles was then spelled out in eleven brief articles: 
• Article 1 made provision for attempts to settle any conflict within the woripltu.w u 
close as possible to where it occurred. The representative function of the trade unions 
was underlined by providing for the establishment of workers' committea in larger 
enterprises with committee members being chosen by the employees concetned. 
• Article 2 covered detldlocked duputes involving specific matters of subatance and the 
introduction of changes in working conditions or special a~ts (lee Article 4 
below). These were to be referred to the executives of the signatories for neaottatioa 
and $ettlement. 
• Article 3 cow red unforeseen problems IDUing during the CU17mCy of the 
It committed the parties to attempt to resolve such issues u they aroae. 
• Article 4 provided for the making of specialllg1'eemmtl on specific matten (e.a. 
insurance and bereawment pay). It was an open~nded provision. 
• Articles 5 and 6 provided for the conciliation of unsettled disputes inYOIYina pnelll 
wage modifications, or special agreements or the interpretation of the Pe~ee Aat~e~nent 
itself. 
• Article 7 covered situations in which a conciliation board was Ulllble to effect a 
ment. It provided for such a board to pronounce an lll'bitnltion tnWI1d lllbj«t to the 
sigMtories previously indicating their willingnm to llCcept mch 111let.,._llon. 
• Article 8 provided for the reference of deadlocked disputes inwlvilla a Willi 
modification or special agreement to be referred to a 1~cilll IUbllrtltlon for lltt)e. 
ment. This procedure was limited to exceptional circumstances where no altematlw 
settlement could be devised and then only upon application of one of the partie~ 
involved. 
• Article 9 specifically excluded questiotU of union membmhlp or non-membmhlp fro1n 
the agreement. 
5 
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,expanding this approach to collective bargaining. It is not proposed to analyll tlda DIW 
agreement in detail here. Certain matters must, however, be highlighted to point to 
cant shifts in approach. 
The preservation of industrial peace was the central purpose of the original 
of I 937. The document negotiated in 1974 had much wider aims and scope. The establilh· 
ment of mutual rights and obligations in employment matters, the promotion of collahora-
tion within enterprises and the resolution of important differences of opinion and disputes 
now took pride of precedence. 
The 1974 agreement saw the extension of worken' committees (works councils) to all 
enterprises not simply larger concerns. The function of such a committee was declared to 
be "defending the interests of all of the entployees under the agreenaent the 
employer and ... taking care of the problems connected with the application of the •a•ee-
ment in the enterprise". 
A restructuring of the provisions governing conciliation and ar~itration wu undertaken 
in the new agreement. Should conciliation become deadlocked, the conciliation board 
could now proceed immediately to arbitration. The award of the board was to be bindins. 
Furthermore, this procedure would apply in all instances and not, as previously, only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
The 1974 agreement also reflected increased concern for resolving disputea at the 
earlier stages. Should workplace negotiations reach an , the parties were now 
entitled to call for assistance from the signatories to the agremnent before the matter w• 
referred to their executives. This provision encompassed changes in wages, working houn 
and methods of payment as well as the interpretation and application of the whole 
agreement. 
• An additional special agreement was included in the 1974 settlement. This cowred 
situations "where enterprises (were) being closed down or transferred to other places, and 
in cases of unemployment". A general right of direct negotiation was estabHshed Jn such 
cases. 
It seems that by 1974 the question of union membership or non-membership wu much 
less sensitive than it had been in 1937. The 1974 agreement excluded reference to the 
rights of unorganised workers. In its place it introduced the concept of the solidllrity 
contribution mentioned earlier. 
One more shift in emphasis in the 1974 agreentent must be noted. The provision of 
caution money as a security against the payment of fines for breach of the ag•eement wu 
eliminated. This at least suggests the development of a high degree of confidence that aU 
parties would live up to their obligations under the agreement. 
At this point, one may ask why the parties decided to extend the scope of the aaree· 
n1ent in the 1974 negotiations. Acceptance of the benefits of collective bargaining by 
employers has already been noted. That, however, does not offer an explanation of why 
trade unions accepted the continuation of the absolute peace obligation in the hardeaiilg 
economic climate of the 1970s. Here several facton were probably influential. The 
itn proved procedures for conciliation and atbitratiQD mentioned above were linked with a 
provision to deal with unanticipated events likely to erode the agreenaent (esseottaDy the 
American concept of "the continuous obligation to bargain"). 
Another factor influencing trade union attitudes may weD have experience wJth 
the joint administration and funding of the so-called PtlnnDJhlp Fund. This fuiacl 
established in 1969 to finance industrial relations and vocational traiotns. How 1M' 
vent u:re illustrates the Swiss tradition of group activity within one's own communttr aac1 
how far it represents mutual support to ensure survival are interesting questioBt. The 
engineering and metalworking industry is unusually sensitive to tade. At»out 
two-thirds of the production of the metal and machinery factori• aad almoat all the out· 
put of watch-making concerns are exported. Without the experience of the fuaclllld 
specia) agreement on the closure of enterprises, the peace aa•ee.tlliDt approaola cm.W well 
have run into 
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that "A II Swiss citizens are eqUill before the law. In Switzerltmd there shilD be no priPileges 
of place, birth, person or family." Despite this, difficulties are being expetienced in provid· 
ing for a constitutional amendment to ensure equal rights and opportunities. In the niCan-
while, women's rates of pay seeut to average about 75 percent of the equivalent male rates 
and a large proportion of the female labour force has had no vocational training. 
The theme of caution continues when one examines rights flowing from the Code of 
Obligations. It outlaws the closed shop (both pre-entry and post-entry) and declares that 
union membership must not be a consideration in selection or training. To SOIDe extent, 
the solidarity contribution mentioned earlier must be seen as a means of owrcoming these 
"negative rights of association". 
Once employed, a Swiss worker is entitled to a limited range of statutory rights. Wages 
and salaries must be paid at monthly intervals unless arrangements exist for a shorter pay 
period. Pay must continue during involuntary absence upon completion of three months 
service (the actual period of benefit accumulates with service but varies with the canton in 
which the individual works). In certain circumstances, such as power cuts, pay must con-
tinue even if work is not available. A minimum of two weeks paid annualleaw is stipulated 
with three weeks for persons under 19; these entitlements may, howewr, be increased to 
three and four weeks respectively by cantonal statute. No provisions exist for certain other 
benefits found in other industrialised countries (for example, educational leaw or paid 
time off for trade union activities). It should be noted that these issues are nevertheless 
often covered in collective agreements. 
Whilst Swiss law requires that proper notice be giwn before dismissal, it does not cover 
the concept of "unfair" dismissal or the matter of victimisation. The employer is placed 
under no legal obligation to give reason for the action whether the case involves summary 
dismissal or dismissal after due notice. Required notice of diSJniss•l varies from seven 
calendar days for probationary employees to three months for peiSOns with at leut nine 
years' service. Long service employees aged SO with 20 years' ser~ce with the same 
employer also qualify for additional severance pay in the event of dismiaa). 
A Particular View of Reality 
The acceptability and effectiveness of the Swiss system of industrial relations seems to 
rest on a particular view of reality which is widely held throughout the Confederation. An 
outsider may fmd it hard to decide whether this view of reality is based on realistic prag-
matism or inherent conservatism. Those favouring the pragmatic explanation wiD point to 
levels of employment in the late 1970s. Despite the current recession, Switzerland still 
had virtually full employment. Relatively high wages were being paid to nieet the high cost 
of living. In 1979 the wages of semi-skilled and skilled industrial worke&a were reported to 
range between SNZ 17,000 and SNZ 21 ,000. Cynics favouring the explanation of inherent 
conservatism will stress other matters. Full employment seems to have been maintained by 
sending home over 220,000 foreign workers in the mid-seventies. Unequal pay for women 
was commonplace. Annual pay increases had been held right down although linked to cost 
of living adjustments. The reason for trade unions not pressing for waae increases owr two 
percent per annum was reported to be acceptance of the fact that ''the appreciation of the 
external value of the franc (had) been cutting into profit margins". (Crossland 1979) 
Whatever the explanation for the widespread view of reality, some two-thirds of the 
country's labour force has chosen to work under absolute peace agree1nenta. The rest 
accept the legal requirement of a relative peace agreement. Furtherauore, poDa of public 
opinion indicate that the peace agreement approach continues to be held in hiP pubUc 
esteem. To this must be added an attitude articulated by the Metalworkers and Watch· 
makers Union: 
The man at the workbench is concerned with other social problen• than hJa 
manager. Tensions cannot be abolished, but only mediated. An aareemont, 
however, is only possible if there are no positions of absolute power owr 
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human beings . This is the reason we need free groups who act as rivals. The 
unions are such a legislative force. They function only in a democracy, i.e. in a 
political system based on synthesis and co-operation of opposite forces which 
also have common concerns. Therefore we cannot live without conflicts, and 
